Despite Federal directives calling for an integrated approach to strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure systems, little is known about the relationship between human behavior and infrastructure resilience. While it is well recognized that human response can either amplify or mitigate catastrophe, the role of human or psychological resilience when infrastructure systems are confronted with surprise remains an oversight in policy documents and resilience research. Existing research treats human resilience and technological resilience as separate capacities that may create stress conditions that act upon one another. There remains a knowledge gap regarding study of those attributes in each that build infrastructure resilience as an integrated system of humans and technologies. This work draws on concepts found in the resilience engineering and psychology literature to examine the dynamic relationships between human resilience and the resilience of complex, sociotechnical critical infrastructure systems. We identify and organize 18 system capacities and 23 human capacities that influence infrastructure resilience. We then correlate individual human and system resilience capacities to determine how each influences four socio-technical processes for resilience: sensing, anticipating, adapting, and learning. Our analysis shows that the human and technical resilience capacities reviewed are interconnected, interrelated, and interdependent. Further, we find current literature is focused more on cognitive and behavioral dimensions of human resilience and we offer ways to better incorporate affective capacities. Together, we present a simple way to link the resilience of technological systems to the cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions of humans responsible for the system design, operation, and management.
Introduction
Human behavior and decision-making can have a positive or negative influence on the resilience of engineered systems, including infrastructure. For example, the catastrophic system failure at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011 was partly because of inadequate anticipation of key constraints related to risk perception and mitigation during plant design (Hollnagel and Fujita 2013; Park et al. 2013) . In subsequent investigations, the flawed design was largely attributed to a working culture that supported false beliefs about safety (IAEA 2015) , combined with the inability to deploy key mitigation assets because a complete loss of power was considered unthinkable prior to the accident. By contrast, operators at the Oroville Dam during February 2017 narrowly averted a catastrophe with similar cultural root causes by successfully adapting organizational, communication, and decision structures to redirect water releases before complete structural collapse of the reservoir became inevitable (Hollins, Eisenberg, and Seager 2018) . Similarly, the successful ditching of US Airways flight No. 1549 in the Hudson River in 2009 demonstrates that the adaptive capacity necessary to respond to surprise can depend on human ability to improvise (Paries 2011) . Barely two minutes after takeoff from La Guardia airport in New York City, Captain Sullenberger's plane struck a flock of geese and lost thrust in both engines. In response, the Captain made several critical decisions including turning on the auxiliary power unit without completing other steps on the dual engine failure checklist and ditching the plane in the Hudson River rather than returning to the airport (NTSB 2010) . The Captain's capacity to cope with extreme ambiguity while maintaining a psychological locus of control enabled him to rapidly assess conditions and make critical decisions, perience of disaster events. When applied to individuals, human resilience describes the capacity to access and maintain physical and psychological resources and to positively adapt to unforeseen conditions and disruptive events (Bonanno 2004; Ungar 2012; Masten 2014b) . Equivalent concepts apply to human systems embedded within and dependent on technological systems like infrastructure (Masten and Obradovic 2010) . Human resilience also refers to the ability of a person or group to tolerate stress and respond to adverse conditions and events in ways that enhances the possibility of positive adaptation and development (Luthar, Cicchetti, and Becker 2000; Masten 2001; Bonanno 2004) . The descriptions of human resilience as positive adaptation and development amid adversity represents a shift that occurred in the psychology literature away from a focus on vulnerability (i.e. what goes wrong) and toward the study of resilience (i.e. what goes right) (Rutter 1987) . The shift in perspective is similar to the concepts brought about in resilience engineering as described above. Thus, each body of literature shares a perspective of resilience that emphasizes 'what works' as opposed to 'what failed' in the context of a disruptive event.
Organizing resilience engineering and human resilience literature provides a basis for integrating human and system capacities influencing the resilience of critical infrastructures. National policies lack detailed explanations for how human resilience may appear in engineered systems like infrastructures and little is known about how human resilience may influence outcomes of coupled systems amid unexpected disruption and uncertainty. Resilience engineering research provides a systems perspective on this issue that reveals the capacities for complex socio-technical systems to continue work and remain safe during crises. Likewise, human resilience research provides a perspective on this issue that reveals the individual human capacities to cope and adapt to adverse situations. We integrate both fields via four socio-technical processes -sensing, anticipating, adapting, and learning (SAAL) -as linking mechanisms for how humans and technological systems interact during surprising events. Our analysis suggests that many of the human, technical, and socio-technical resilience capacities reviewed are interconnected, interrelated, and interdependent when applied to the SAAL framework. While reinforcing the important roles of cognitive and behavioral dimensions, our findings further suggests that the affective dimension of human resilience is effectively ignored in the resilience engineering literature. We argue that the resilience of critical infrastructures can be influenced by the cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions of human resilience that are linked by the SAAL socio-technical processes.
Resilience and Infrastructure Systems
The interdependencies of multiple overlapping human and physical infrastructure systems have significant implications for large-scale disaster scenarios (Masten and Obradovic 2010) . This is because critical interactions between people and infrastructure can lead to unexpected and uncertain conditions and outcomes that can propagate across operational domains (Woods 2015) . That is, disaster events and catastrophic failures can disrupt human interactions with infrastructure and lead to cascading breakdowns among other coupled complex systems like water, power, and transportation (Park et al. 2013) . Moreover, the people occupying front-line roles and responsibilities like operators in the control room of a power plant are engaged in proximal interactions with infrastructure that can influence possible adaptive pathways and outcomes (Hollnagel et al. 2011) . First responders, individual operators, and working groups interacting with and managing critical technological systems and services are examples of individual people embedded in the operational flow and contributing to infrastructure resilience. To examine the interdependencies of human and infrastructure resilience, it is important to understand how resilience appears in the literature related to technical systems and contrast that with resilience literature in the social sciences.
Resilience Concepts and Definitions
Although a practical interpretation of resilience can vary by application, complexity, and context, a conceptual definition broad enough to encompass human and technical dimensions is needed. This means a resilience engineering approach must consider multiple interpretations and perspectives of resilience to account for people as dynamic components of socio-technical systems. Furthermore, the definition must provide a meaningful reference to context to support comparing human and technical resilience capacities. Several authors have compiled lists of resilience definitions (Hassler and Kohler 2014; Hosseini, Barker, and Ramirez-Marquez 2015; Righi, Saurin, and Wachs 2015; Woods 2015) . Likewise, multiple frameworks have been proposed for resilience analysis (Madni and Jackson 2009; Hollnagel et al. 2011; Hollnagel 2012; Park et al. 2013; Linkov et al. 2018) . This points to a lack of common reference to validated terms, concepts, definitions, and frameworks of resilience in the resilience engineering literature. In general, resilience refers to the capacity of a system to absorb a shock or disruption and either return to homeostasis or re-organize to a new state of stable operation (Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011; Reid and Botterill 2013; Brand and Jax 2007) . Reorganization may include adjusting state variables or by changing connections among existing structures. Previous descriptions of "engineering resilience" may be viewed as an efficiency of function that is measured by the time required for the system to return to a steady state (Holling 1996) or as a complex adaptive system with dynamic feedback allowing for continuous adjustment (Pendall, Foster, and Cowell 2009) , suggesting an approach to resilience that emphasizes resistance and control. However, resilience may also be viewed as emergent process in response to a system disruption (Park et al. 2013) . The emergent processes represent the dynamic relationships between systems and components that effectively adjust parameters and govern interactions to maintain viable performance levels. The concept of resilience as an emergent property holds promise because the interdependent feedback loops that characterize complex socio-technological systems will inevitably defy traditional engineering controls.
Notwithstanding the many definitions of resilience, our socio-technical perspective builds on the definition provided by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) that describes resilience as the ability to plan for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to actual and possible disruptive events (Cutter et al. 2012) . We choose to build upon the NAS definition as it applies to infrastructure for several important reasons. First, the NAS definition provides a reference frame in time that characterizes distinct state transitions prior to, during, and after system shocks, stressors, and catastrophic disruptions. Each reference frame describes a specific capacity of infrastructure systems that requires both technological functioning and human actions to succeed. Second, the NAS definition is consistent with disaster policy and with definitions adapted by US government agencies. Moreover, an important factor in this definition is the ability to anticipate and prepare for unknown disruptions (Hollnagel and Fujita 2013) creating the presumption that humans are involved. The capacity to plan and prepare for possible threats and mitigate potential risks also engages learning from prior experiences to develop strategies for resilient pathways. Finally, the NAS definition and framework has proved useful in showing how various resilience concepts are shared among different perspectives and applications including psychology and engineering (Connelly et al. 2017; Wood et al. 2018) . Taken together, the NAS definition is both broad for socio-technical context and practical for infrastructure design, operation, and management.
Methods
We identify, compile, and organize resilience capacities from resilience engineering and human resilience literature. Resilience capacities are found throughout the literature to conceptualize the characteristics of resilient socio-technical systems (Woods 2006; Madni and Jackson 2009; Dinh et al. 2012 ) and of human resilience (Luthar, Cicchetti, and Becker 2000; Masten 2001; Lipsitt and Demick 2012) . We identify and integrate human and socio-technical resilience capacities with a four-step process:
1. Reviewing the resilience engineering literature to identify a list of system capacities (see Appendix A, which includes summary descriptions and citations); 2. Reviewing of the psychology and psychiatry literature to identify human resilience capacities for an individual person (see Appendix B, which includes summary descriptions and citations);
3. Organizing identified capacities with socio-technical processes that link system resilience to human resilience;
4. Examining the relationships between the human and system domains by comparing the overlap of capacities for each socio-technical process.
Finally, we examine how the human and technical resilience capacities combine to influence the resilience of coupled socio-technical systems and inform national infrastructure policies that lack discussion of human resilience.
Resilient System Capacities

Resilience Engineering
Resilience engineering considers the dynamic interactions among systems that rely on human abilities to learn from prior experiences, and to anticipate possible conditions and outcomes (Hollnagel et al. 2011) . The inclusion of human abilities forms the basis of socio-technical systems that acknowledge the role of humans, including designers, operators, managers, and users embedded within, and interacting with, technical systems. Whereas a risk analysis approach to prevention and mitigation requires identification of hazards and characterization of failure probabilities, a resilience approach considers how complex adaptive systems like critical infrastructure may respond to surprise and unknown threats (Park et al. 2013) . Thus, in contrast to a traditional approach to risks focusing on the prevention of undesirable outcomes, resilience engineering extends beyond risk management and includes the dynamic processes that characterize how systems behave (Madni and Jackson 2009 ).
Resilience engineering scholars reference a range of system attributes like adaptive capacity (Madni and Jackson 2009 ), avoidance (Larkin et al. 2015) , flexibility (Paries 2011) , tolerance (Woods 2006) , and efficacy (Hollnagel et al. 2011 ) that contribute to the ability of a system to absorb, recover, and adapt system performance amid disruption. Table 1 presents 18 socio-technical system capacities found in a review of resilience engineering and infrastructure systems literature. While not exhaustive, the list represents many of the core concepts associated with system resilience. The range of capacities reflects the multidimensional nature of resilience (Brown and Westaway 2011) applied to infrastructure. The capacities may be viewed as antecedents or latent propensities that influence resilience processes and outcomes in response to system shocks. Appendix A expands on Table 1 by including summary descriptions and references for each capacity. Taken together, the capacities combine with resilience processes to characterize resilience of technical systems. 
Socio-technical system resilience capacities
Appendix A includes descriptions and references for each attribute found in our review of resilience engineering literature.
Human Resilience Capacities
Human resilience capacities are the qualities (variables, characteristics, protective factors, and personality traits) serving to protect or compensate individuals exposed to risks and adversity (Masten 2001) . Table 2 presents the 23 human resilience capacities identified in the psychology and psychiatry literature (Kumpfer 1995; Richardson 2002; Olsson et al. 2003; Connor 2006; Resnick and Inguito 2011; Garcia-Dia et al. 2013 ) reflecting the multidimensional nature of the resilience of a person (Luthar, Cicchetti, and Becker 2000) . Moreover, the resilience capacities in Table 2 , which are psychological in nature, represent the internal characteristics known to correlate with resilient outcomes (Kumpfer 1995) amid adverse conditions or events (See Appendix B for further information). Adapted and arranged in groups by cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions. The list is compiled from a survey of the psychology and psychiatry literature (Connor 2006; Garcia-Dia et al. 2013; Kumpfer 1995; Olsson et al. 2003; Resnick and Inguito 2011; Richardson 2002) . The assignment to a group is based on the heuristic approach described in section 3 of this paper. 1 Capacities organized by dimension in literature (Kumpfer 1995) .
Cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions serve as category organizers representing the resilience capacities of individuals proximal to infrastructure operating environments. The three dimensions are selected because they appear in the psychology (Kumpfer 1995; Mischel and Shoda 1995; Reich, Zautra, and Hall 2010) literature on resilience, and because they provide a meaningful way to group the resilience capacities. These are important because prodigious evidence from prior events suggests that human factors can play a significant role -positive or negative -in the outcomes of catastrophic accidents, complex system failures, and disaster scenarios (Leavitt and Kiefer 2006; Brown and Westaway 2011; Hollnagel et al. 2011; Perrow 2011) . Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth nothing that sociological factors related to human development can also influence how people interact with technology. For example, societal considerations like poverty, race, or social inequality can give rise to an uneven distribution of risks, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity, which can lead to unanticipated outcomes in response to adversity (Clark, Seager, and Selinger 2015; Thomas, Eisenberg, and Seager 2018) .
Linking Human and Infrastructure Resilience
The human dimensions of resilience introduce new sources of novelty, innovation, and uncertainty, as well as the capacity to self-organize (Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011). The diversity of coupled systems in a critical infrastructure scenario implies that knowledge from multiple disciplines (e.g. psychology and engineering) must be included to understand the resilience of the composite system . Moreover, the dynamic behavior, motivations, and intentional interactions between humans and technological systems contribute to the characterization of the resilience of coupled complex systems (Hollnagel and Fujita 2013; Park et al. 2013 ). Thus, a resilience engineering approach to infrastructure must incorporate multiple perspectives, methods, and interpretations of resilience to account for embedded human subjects .
A better understanding of the relationships between the dimensions of human resilience and the processes influencing socio-technical systems can inform methods and adjustments to improve system performance.
Resilience Processes
Socio-technical System Processes: Sensing, Anticipating, Adapting, and Learning
The characterization of resilient socio-technical systems with four dynamic processes as introduced by Hollnagel et al. (2011 ), Hollnagel et al. 2011 ) is widely adopted in resilience engineering literature (Madni and Jackson 2009; Rankin et al. 2013; Righi, Saurin, and Wachs 2015) . These four processes suggest that resilient systems are the result of human factors applied on a system-wide scale, and consist of: monitoring -knowing what to look for; anticipating -knowing what to expect; responding -knowing what to do; and learning -knowing what has happened. Hollnagel (2012 Hollnagel ( , and 2014 furthermore developed the functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) to show how each of the four resilience processes are dynamically coupled to the other processes and to identify the dependencies among them. Together, Hollnagel and others' work with FRAM (Hollnagel 2012; Cvijetic and Netjasovov Feda 2015; Tian et al. 2016 ) demonstrate the feasibility of linking human actions and technological system response via processes. The four processes are focused on different ways of knowing and thus emphasize a cognitive perspective of how humans can influence system resilience. This important consideration offers valuable insight about how people access information and expert knowledge to interact with infrastructure in response to acute stressors or system shocks. Although a sole focus on cognition precludes the consideration of other influences on individuals and groups interacting with technical systems, the underlying framework can accommodate a range of human perspectives.
An important refinement to the framework by Park et al. (2013) emphasizes the recursive nature of four sociotechnical processes characterizing the dynamic behavior of resilient systems: sensing, anticipating, adapting, and learning (SAAL). The SAAL processes describe how humans and social systems interact with technological systems like infrastructure to maintain a viable level of operation in both expected and unexpected conditions. Resilience engineering engages the processes to manage operational boundary conditions and sustain adaptive capacity amid external stressors (Rankin et al. 2013) . In this way, the SAAL processes mediate the capacity of a system to cope with surprise and adapt to changing conditions. The four SAAL processes are summarized as follows (Hollnagel et al. 2011; Hollnagel and Fujita 2013; Linkov et al. 2013; Park et al. 2013 ):
• Sensing processes apprehend and interpret information about a system's operational states relative to known and unknown vulnerabilities and system shocks. Learning informs sensing about what to look for based on prior experience. Anticipating informs sensing by providing inputs about what to look for or what system conditions to expect disruption or change. Sensing also includes access to physical and functional indicators and methods for monitoring the environment at the operational boundary for thresholds and threats impacting system performance.
• Anticipating describes the processes involved with imagining, planning, and preparing for possible system changes, emergency events, and crises scenarios relative to present and future conditions of the system, which includes impacts at boundaries. Anticipating considers known potential failures in addition to unexpected changes in system states. A resilient system aims to anticipate both threats and opportunities that can impact performance. Because anticipating extends to include potential future states -known and unknown -a resilient system is sentient and self-reflective about operating conditions and potential impacts at the boundary. This shows how humans are a vital component of complex socio-technical systems and serves an important role interacting with the resilience processes.
• Adapting describes the processes governing system responses to both known and unknown changes in stability and operating performance. A system adapts to changing conditions and either returns to its previous state or shifts to a different operating state while maintaining a viable level of essential functions. The adaptive capacity of a complex socio-technical system determines its ability to compensate for stressors by considering tradeoffs with capacities like efficiency and safe operation at the system boundary.
• Learning integrates an open loop cycle of interrelatedness among each subgroup of processes (i.e. sensing, anticipating, and adapting) to inform and adjust system outcomes while retaining knowledge for future access. Learning becomes possible when information from prior experiences or system disruptions serve to inform and mitigate current experiences. Dynamic feedback from sensing can enable adaptive learning during a disruptive event whereby real-time adjustments follow intentional changes in response to status updates on conditions and system performance.
The SAAL processes offer a mechanism for exploring the relationships between human resilience and sociotechnical system resilience. Moreover, the recursive processes can serve as a guide to interrogate a system and to assess its capacity to navigate resources and adjust functioning in response to changes in its environment. The SAAL processes readily accommodate the cognitive and behavioral dimensions although it is less apparent how they may consider the affective dimension.
Human Resilience Processes
Unlike a human resilience capacities perspective, a process perspective compares dynamic processes representing adaptive patterns of actions and behaviors by people in differing context and time scales to identify high-risk individuals more susceptible to adversity (Rutter 1987; Luthar, Cicchetti, and Becker 2000; Masten 2001 Masten , 2014b . In a context of infrastructure, psychological human resilience capacities combine with dynamic processes to characterize the resilience of people interacting with coupled complex systems. That is, the interactional processes represent a coupling mechanism linking human resilience capacities with a socio-technical system. Moreover, resilience processes link the internal characteristics of a person to the external environment and outcomes. Systems-theoretical perspectives of human resilience that incorporates dynamic processes emerged from the application of general systems theory (Von Bertalanffy, L 1968) to human development (Masten 2007; Ungar, Ghazinour, and Richter 2013) . Humans are conceptualized as a myriad of overlapping biological, psychological, neurological, and sociological systems interacting via processes with each other and with other complex systems in their proximal environment. In an infrastructure scenario, a systems perspective considers the resilience and adaptive processes representing the relationships between a person and interdependent technological systems.
Integrated Socio-technical Framework for Resilient Infrastructure
We apply a 'person-process-context' concept from the psychology literature describing how humans interact with their environment (Bronfenbrenner 2005) to develop a novel model linking system and individual human resilience capacities with the SAAL processes. The structure of the model (Figure 1 ) supports the rationale for relating human and socio-technical resilience capacities by engaging the dynamic processes that characterize the relationships and interactions between humans and infrastructure. There are two key motivations for this approach. First, the person-process-context concept is foundational in the psychology literature influencing a wide stream of human resilience and development research (Masten 2014a; Sameroff 2010; Ungar, Ghazinour, and Richter 2013) . Second, the conceptual model in Figure 1 provides a simple and convenient structure for integrating human and technological concepts. We incorporate the person-process-context concept by substituting infrastructure as the contextual environment. We then apply the SAAL processes as a linking mechanism to examine the relationships between the human and socio-technical resilience capacities. Whereas the NAS definition fails to describe how its planning and preparing, absorbing, recovering, and adapting capacities are realized, SAAL identifies the processes that must be undertaken to create these capacities. It is important to note that NAS capacities differ from SAAL processes despite using similar terminology. While adaptation in the NAS sense refers to improvements in system function, adaptation in SAAL refers to socio-technical actions that influence system function. In other words, the capacity for an infrastructure system to improve function post disruption ("adapt" in NAS terminology) depends on successful negotiation between human and technological ability to take action ("adapt" in SAAL terminology). Table 3 synthesizes and summarizes the results from implementing the steps described in the methods section above for each group of capacities. The cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions organize human capacities of an individual. 
Linking System and Human Capacities
Technical System Capacities
The heuristic for relating the socio-technical capacities to the SAAL processes includes comparing the descriptions of each process provided in section 5.1.1 and the descriptions of the capacities provided in Appendix A. Seven of the 18 system capacities are assigned to adapting processes and six to sensing with anticipating and learning receiving three and two, respectively. As a result, adapting is the most influential, which aligns well with other research investigating the relationship between the SAAL processes and infrastructure resilience (Mathias et al. 2018) . Although each of the SAAL processes are represented, the minimal distribution of system capacities for anticipating and learning suggest those processes are less emphasized among the 18 capacities reviewed in this group.
Human Capacities
The heuristic for relating the human capacities to the SAAL processes includes comparing the descriptions of each process provided in section 5.1.1 and the descriptions of the capacities provided in Appendix B. The human capacities in Table 3 are organized by cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions described in section 4.2 and distributed among the SAAL processes. Sensing dominates the cognitive dimension while adapting dominates both the affective and behavioral dimensions. None of the capacities are assigned to the behavioral dimension of anticipating, which suggests that these processes rely more on the capacities assigned to the cognitive and affective dimensions among the 23 considered. The affective dimension is largest with a total of nine capacities while cognitive and behavioral both have seven. Among the SAAL processes, adapting is largest with nine capacities followed by six with sensing, five with learning, and 3 with anticipating when cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions are combined.
Discussion
The results suggests that the SAAL processes can serve as a linking mechanism that shows how the cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions of human resilience capacities are interconnected with, interrelated to, and interdependent on system resilience capacities.
Human and Socio-technical Resilience Capacities are Interconnected
The relationships between human and socio-technical resilience capacities shown in Figure 1 and Table 3 point to the interconnectedness of these capacities within coupled human and socio-technical systems. That is, certain psychological capacities that correlate with the resilience of an individual human also correlate with certain resilience capacities of a socio-technical system.
The cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions reflect the interconnectedness of the human and infrastructure resilience capacities by their mutual relationship to the SAAL processes. The relationship between the cognitive dimension and SAAL extends from Hollnagel et al. (2011) (Friborg et al. 2005) . These capacities (e.g. moral reasoning, goals, and balanced perspective on experience) reflect individual abilities to access relevant information and expert knowledge to influence infrastructure resilience by enabling the four abilities of knowing. The work by Park et al. (2013) points to the relationship between the behavioral dimension of resilience capacities and the SAAL processes. Behavioral capacities influence resilient behavior and interactions between an individual person or group and their proximal environment (Kumpfer 1995) , which refers to infrastructure for the applications considered in this paper. These capacities (e.g. engaging the support of others, action-oriented approach, and tolerance of negative effect) characterize individual abilities to physically interact with systems and manage operational boundary conditions. In this way, the behavioral capacities reflect how human agency can impact infrastructure resilience by enacting the SAAL processes -sensing, anticipating, adapting, and learning.
Prior work in resilience engineering effectively ignores the relationship between the affective dimension of human resilience and the socio-technical processes that describe a resilient infrastructure system. According to the psychology literature, affective resilience capacities engage the experience of emotions to influence resilient behavior (Ong, Bergeman, and Chow 2010) . Moreover, affective resilience capacities (e.g. hopefulness, optimism, and internal locus of control) can influence both cognitive and behavioral dispositions (Reich, Zautra, and Hall 2010 ) that determine how people may or may not respond to disruptive conditions. Thus, affective capacities are interconnected to system capacities because each can influence the SAAL processes that determine infrastructure resilience. Taken together, the cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions elucidate the interconnection between individual psychological resilience capacities and system capacities.
Human and Socio-technical Resilience Capacities are Interrelated
A comparison between individual human capacities and socio-technical systems shows the interrelated nature of coupled systems. For example, the human capacity 'internal locus of control' found in the psychology literature has a conceptual correlate in the resilience engineering literature with the capacity 'control'. The concept of 'control' is particularly important in both human and technical contexts. In psychology, an internal locus of control describes perspectives of self-regulation over one's internal resources that enable abilities such as making decisions and taking action. The human resilience capacity 'internal locus of control' inspires a belief in one's own effectiveness in relation to extreme adversity (Olsson et al. 2003; Noltemeyer and Bush 2013; Werner 2014) . Moreover, a sense of control impacts the ability to cope and to function (Garcia-Dia et al. 2013 ) and helps guide self-efficacy and a sense of personal integrity (Kaminsky et al. 2007 ). Compared to psychological concepts of control, resilience engineering considers the control of a resilient system as the ability to manage adaptive capacities amid surprise (Woods 2015) or unanticipated disruptive events. In other words, a controlled system is able to achieve specified or desirable states of operation while avoiding undesirable states (Dinh et al. 2012) . Thus, the control of a resilient system effectively enables the system to adapt to surprise events. In applications such as infrastructure, control refers to the ability of a system to regulate brittleness at its operational boundary by making specific performance adjustments in response to surprise (Woods 2015) . This is a dynamic form of adapting. An essential condition for maintaining control of a system is the ability to acknowledge when a situation exceeds the performance level anticipated by the operators (Hollnagel et al. 2011 ). This points to a possible relationship between anticipating and adapting to surprise, and suggests that operator training and experience, which support anticipating, are important factors in establishing and maintaining system control (cf. Hollnagel et al. 2011 for possible "negative" interference between anticipation and serendipity).
The relationship between the system capacity of control and the sense of control that support individual human adaptive capacities supports our rationale for ascribing 'control' to the SAAL process, adapting, as shown in Table 3 . Likewise, there are other human and socio-technical system capacities (e.g. coping, efficacy, and goals) that share similar terms, descriptions, and processes with one another although the meaning of these terms in technological and psycho-social contexts has not to our knowledge been compared. Moreover, these capacities and others are interrelated because each capacity contributes to the same basic phenomenon (i.e. infrastructure resilience) via a common relationship with the SAAL processes similar to the description above for control.
Human and Socio-technical Resilience Capacities are Interdependent
In the psychology literature coping is often described as a resilience characteristic (Connor 2006; Kaminsky et al. 2007; Garcia-Dia et al. 2013) , an outcome (Garcia-Dia et al. 2013), or a part of the resilience process (Masten, Best, and Garmezy 1990). Although coping can include cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions (Skodol 2010) , the emotional dimension of coping is associated with higher levels of distress and supports feelings of control (Folkman and Moskowitz 2004) . By comparison, a resilient socio-technical system must be able to cope with unexpected perturbations that extend beyond design expectation (Hollnagel and Fujita 2013) . Resilience engineering describes failure as the inability of a system to cope with increasing complexity (Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson 2006) and to maintain control over operational performance amid adversity (Madni and Jackson 2009 ). In coupled systems, the human capacity to cope with adversity is therefore dependent on the socio-technical systems' capacity to cope and vice versa. Coping and control are examples of interdependent resilience capacities because they have a mutual influence on one another. Likewise, other resilience capacities are interdependent because coupled systems rely upon the human ability to accommodate unknown changes and disruptions.
Conclusion
Despite the scholarly basis for viewing human individuals -including those responsible for the design, operation, and management of infrastructure -as dynamic components of the built environment that can impact system resilience and outcomes, Federal directives seeking an integrated approach to strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure fail to consider how human resilience may contribute to technological resilience. The SAAL resilience processes serve as a linking mechanism between human and technological domains. The diversity of capacities and processes identified reflects the multidimensional nature of infrastructure resilience by effectively integrating definitions and concepts from the psychology, infrastructure, and resilience engineering literatures. Our findings suggest that human and technological resilience capacities are interconnected, interrelated, and interdependent to one another. Moreover, they suggest that the affective dimension of human resilience may be more critical than tends to be acknowledged in resilience engineering literature. Thus, we argue that cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions of human resilience contribute to the resilience of infrastructure essential to public health, safety, and well-being.
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Buffering
Kind/size of perturbations that can be absorbed/adapted to, without compromising performance (Woods 2006) 5. Cohesion Strong forces that unify or bring together; the capacity of a system to function as a whole unit amid threats and disruption (Fiksel 2003; Larkin et al. 2015; Mu et al. 2011; Jackson and Ferris 2012) 6. Compensation Engaging additional resources like buffering and reserve margin to maintain stability within a viable operating region during adaptive system failure. Adapting performance to cope with increased demand (Rankin et al. 2013) 7. Control Adaptive capacity management in relation to tradeoffs among multiple dimensions, dynamic access to a preferred system state (Woods 2015; Alderson, Gerald Brown, and Matthew Carlyle 2014; Dinh et al. 2012) 8. Coping Capacity to sustain unexpected surprise and complexity, local and spontaneous (Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson 2006; Madni and Jackson 2009; Labaka, Hernantes, and Sarriegi 2016) 9. Diversity Variety of system operational/functional behavior and performance; multiple products and services; alternative plant location (Fiksel 2003; Larkin et al. 2015; Mu et al. 2011) 10. Efficacy Effectiveness of system to identify and mitigate hazards, System response to specific inputs and risks (Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson 2006; Haimes 2009) 11. Efficiency Tradeoff with brittleness at boundary conditions; maintain a viable operating level with minimal resource consumption (Fiksel 2003; Hollnagel et al. 2011) 12. Flexibility Capacity to adjust performance in response to external changes, threats, boundary conditions, and viable operating region; lack of flexibility contributes to brittleness; exploit resilience principle (Woods 2006; Paries 2011; Dinh et al. 2012; Jackson and Ferris 2012) 13. Goals management Tradeoff between acute and chronic goals; conflicting goals pit safety against efficiency; dynamic balancing (Woods 2006) 14. Maneuverability Ability to regulate the risk of brittleness; ability to manage variability; continuous adjustment to conditions (Madni and Jackson 2009) 15. Margin Ability to manage boundary conditions; how close is the system operation to boundary; successful compensation (Woods 2006) 16. Pinging, early detection
Proactive probing for changes in risk profile, rapid and accurate access to changes in system states (Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson 2006; Dinh et al. 2012) 17. Survival Ability of system to persevere and survive while providing a viable level of service (Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson 2006) 18. Tolerance How a system behaves at the boundary; graceful or abrupt degradation Personal beliefs that promote a sense of meaning and purpose; ability to sustain effort over time; help overcome negative effect of personal, social, and economic risks; a sense of equanimity about one's life conditions (Olsson et al. 2003; Sinclair and Wallston 2004; Skodol 2010; Dyer and Mcguinness 1996) 2. Fortitude, conviction, tenacity, and resolve
Perseverance to tasks and goals; sustained by a deeply held belief that life has meaning; beliefs that sustain motivation and effort to adapt/survive; mastery motivation; agency (Masten and Wright 2010; Olsson et al. 2003; Masten 2014a; Dyer and Mcguinness 1996) 3. Moral reasoning Informed conscience, capacity to judge right from wrong; valuing compassion, fairness and decency; internal standards for the way things should be; based on ethical grounds; moral perception associated with faith (Kumpfer 1995; Stokols, Lejano, and Hipp 2013) 4. Perceive beneficial/strengthening effect of stress Viewing stress as an opportunity for growth; positive perception of stress; enhanced optimism, patience, and perceived value of interpersonal communications; posttraumatic growth; learning from crises (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Rutter 1985; Lyons 1991; Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004; Kobasa 1979) 5. Personal/collective goals Ability to set desirable objectives and obtain a sense of mastery when life events threaten beliefs; contribute to a sense of coherence and meaning; self regulation (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Rutter 1985; Mayer and Faber 2010) 6. Self-esteem Having a value, acceptance, and respect of oneself; sense of self-worth; positive self-appraisal of personal strengths and capabilities; enhanced by creativity (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Skodol 2010; Campbell, Chew, and Scratchley 1991; Rutter 1987; Kumpfer 1995) 7. View change/stress as a challenge/opportunity Perceive stress as a vehicle of positive change; experiences of awakening to responsibility, validation and acceptance from others; able to be self-nurturing to recognize and seek-out individual needs (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Kobasa 1979; Skodol 2010; Lyons 1991) 
Affective Dimension
Human resilience Description, findings Authors
Affective 8. Coping The emotional dimension of coping involves adopting new perspectives of adverse events to benefit one's values and beliefs thereby supporting feelings of control; An emotional approach to adaptation involving the expression of emotions as a means of actively moving toward acceptance and positive re-appraisal of stressful encounters; Buffer effects of stress on psychological outcomes; Availability of responses to endure stress (Luthar, Cicchetti, and Becker 2000; Folkman and Moskowitz 2004; Stanton, Parsa, and Austenfeld 2002; Sinclair and Wallston 2004; Kobasa 1979; Skodol 2010) 9. Faith, religion Helps integrate meaning of both individual and social disruptive life events; Religious beliefs help stabilize emotions and emotional behavior and can help promote emotional resilience; Positively influences an individual's ability to cope with life stressors and impacts subjective well-being (Park and Folkman 1997; Murphy, Johnson, and Lohan 2003; Freud 2012; Krause 2003; Pargament and Cummings 2010) 10. Hopefulness Positive motivation/outlook based on successful agency; associated with positive adaptation to stress (Kumpfer 1995; Olsson et al. 2003; Ong, Edwards, and Bergeman 2006) 11. Internal locus of control
Believing that life's challenges are related more to an individual's behavior rather than bad luck or some other person; contributes to effective coping; belief that one is an active participant and determinant of outcomes (Skodol 2010; Kobasa 1979; Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Kumpfer 1995) 12. Optimism Positive appraisal/outlook of stressful events or adverse conditions; belief that one can influence the outcome of a stressful situation; associated with coping, positive reinterpretation, and seeking support (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Kumpfer 1995; Skodol 2010) 13. Patience Capacity to accept/tolerate delay, accepting of conditions without undue stress (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Lyons 1991) 
14.
Self-commitment
Pledge to self; adherence and persevere with of intention, direction, and responsibility; ability to feel deeply involved; belief system minimizes perceived threat; vital to health under stress (Kobasa 1979; Kumpfer 1995; Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006) 15. Sense of humor Able to view the ironic and amusing aspects of stress and conflict; cognitive reappraisal to adjust perspective and reference frame of experience to evoke positive emotion/meaning; emotional regulation; defense mechanism to ameliorate stress (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Rutter 1985; Fraser, Galinsky, and Richman 1999; Feder et al. 2010; Skodol 2010) 16. Sense of meaningfulness, purpose
Self-perception of values, goals, capabilities; cognitive control (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Kobasa 1979) Behavioral Dimension
Human resilience Description References
Behavioral 17. Ability to adapt to change Adjust behavior to accommodate environmental conditions, stressors, and negative effects; ability to anticipate and plan and take reflective actions, related to agency (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Rutter 1985; Kumpfer 1995; Brown and Westaway 2011) 18. Ability to use past successes to confront current challenge Capacity to engage cognitive reappraisal to find benefit from stressors; accepting of life conditions and imperfections (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Pargament and Cummings 2010) 19. Agency, action-oriented approach Mastery motivation system, self-perception of positive and effective action, enact adaptive pathways, capacity to self-direct, builds confidence (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Rutter 1985; Masten and Wright 2010; Brown and Westaway 2011) 20. Engaging the support of others (a.k.a. social support)
Social resources (friends and relatives) promote positive adaptation; mentors and role models can alleviate stress; acts as a stress buffer; outlet for expression of feelings and assist navigating life conditions; facilitates adjustment to trauma (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Rutter 1985; Skodol 2010; Friborg and Hjemdal 2003; Garcia-Dia et al. 2013) 21. Secure attachments to others
Close bonding relationships; universal process in human development that begins in infancy with caregivers, parents, and family; also involves close relationships with friends and romantic partners; threats trigger behaviors seeking contact and reassurance; provides secure base for exploring the world; supports the process of agency and mastery motivation (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Olsson et al. 2003; Masten and Wright 2010; Ungar 2006; Friborg and Hjemdal 2003) 22. Self-efficacy Belief and confidence in one's ability to achieve a goal and overcome adversity and disruptive events; self-confidence; belief in one's ability to navigate and manage difficulties effectively (Garcia-Dia et al. 2013; Rutter 1993 Rutter , 1987 Olsson et al. 2003; Skodol 2010) 23. Tolerance of negative effect Sufficient internal coping mechanisms to manage stressors; strategies for dealing with traumatic conditions (Connor and Davidson 2003; Connor 2006; Olsson et al. 2003; Smith 1999) 
